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## Configuration file for a typical Tor user |
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## Last updated 9 October 2013 for Tor 0.2.5.2-alpha. |
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## (may or may not work for much older or much newer versions of Tor.) |
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## |
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## Lines that begin with "## " try to explain what's going on. Lines |
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## that begin with just "#" are disabled commands: you can enable them |
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## by removing the "#" symbol. |
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## |
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## See 'man tor', or https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html, |
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## for more options you can use in this file. |
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## |
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## Tor will look for this file in various places based on your platform: |
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## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#torrc |
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## Tor opens a socks proxy on port 9050 by default -- even if you don't |
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## configure one below. Set "SocksPort 0" if you plan to run Tor only |
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## as a relay, and not make any local application connections yourself. |
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#SocksPort 9050 # Default: Bind to localhost:9050 for local connections. |
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#SocksPort 192.168.0.1:9100 # Bind to this address:port too. |
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## Entry policies to allow/deny SOCKS requests based on IP address. |
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## First entry that matches wins. If no SocksPolicy is set, we accept |
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## all (and only) requests that reach a SocksPort. Untrusted users who |
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## can access your SocksPort may be able to learn about the connections |
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## you make. |
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#SocksPolicy accept 192.168.0.0/16 |
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#SocksPolicy reject * |
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## Logs go to stdout at level "notice" unless redirected by something |
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## else, like one of the below lines. You can have as many Log lines as |
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## you want. |
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## |
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## We advise using "notice" in most cases, since anything more verbose |
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## may provide sensitive information to an attacker who obtains the logs. |
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## |
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## Send all messages of level 'notice' or higher to /var/log/tor/notices.log |
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#Log notice file /var/log/tor/notices.log |
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## Send every possible message to /var/log/tor/debug.log |
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#Log debug file /var/log/tor/debug.log |
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## Use the system log instead of Tor's logfiles |
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#Log notice syslog |
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## To send all messages to stderr: |
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#Log debug stderr |
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## Uncomment this to start the process in the background... or use |
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## --runasdaemon 1 on the command line. This is ignored on Windows; |
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## see the FAQ entry if you want Tor to run as an NT service. |
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#RunAsDaemon 1 |
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## The directory for keeping all the keys/etc. By default, we store |
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## things in $HOME/.tor on Unix, and in Application Data\tor on Windows. |
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#DataDirectory /var/lib/tor |
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## The port on which Tor will listen for local connections from Tor |
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## controller applications, as documented in control-spec.txt. |
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#ControlPort 9051 |
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## If you enable the controlport, be sure to enable one of these |
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## authentication methods, to prevent attackers from accessing it. |
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#HashedControlPassword 16:872860B76453A77D60CA2BB8C1A7042072093276A3D701AD684053EC4C |
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#CookieAuthentication 1 |
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############### This section is just for location-hidden services ### |
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## Once you have configured a hidden service, you can look at the |
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## contents of the file ".../hidden_service/hostname" for the address |
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## to tell people. |
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## |
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## HiddenServicePort x y:z says to redirect requests on port x to the |
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## address y:z. |
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#HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/hidden_service/ |
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#HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80 |
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HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/kaos/ |
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HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80 |
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HiddenServicePort 22 127.0.0.1:22 |
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################ This section is just for relays ##################### |
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# |
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## See https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-doc-relay for details. |
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## Required: what port to advertise for incoming Tor connections. |
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#ORPort 9001 |
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## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in |
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## ORPort (e.g. to advertise 443 but bind to 9090), you can do it as |
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## follows. You'll need to do ipchains or other port forwarding |
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## yourself to make this work. |
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#ORPort 443 NoListen |
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#ORPort 127.0.0.1:9090 NoAdvertise |
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## The IP address or full DNS name for incoming connections to your |
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## relay. Leave commented out and Tor will guess. |
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#Address noname.example.com |
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## If you have multiple network interfaces, you can specify one for |
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## outgoing traffic to use. |
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# OutboundBindAddress 10.0.0.5 |
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## A handle for your relay, so people don't have to refer to it by key. |
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#Nickname ididnteditheconfig |
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## Define these to limit how much relayed traffic you will allow. Your |
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## own traffic is still unthrottled. Note that RelayBandwidthRate must |
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## be at least 20 KB. |
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## Note that units for these config options are bytes per second, not bits |
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## per second, and that prefixes are binary prefixes, i.e. 2^10, 2^20, etc. |
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#RelayBandwidthRate 100 KB # Throttle traffic to 100KB/s (800Kbps) |
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#RelayBandwidthBurst 200 KB # But allow bursts up to 200KB/s (1600Kbps) |
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## Use these to restrict the maximum traffic per day, week, or month. |
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## Note that this threshold applies separately to sent and received bytes, |
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## not to their sum: setting "4 GB" may allow up to 8 GB total before |
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## hibernating. |
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## |
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## Set a maximum of 4 gigabytes each way per period. |
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#AccountingMax 4 GB |
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## Each period starts daily at midnight (AccountingMax is per day) |
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#AccountingStart day 00:00 |
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## Each period starts on the 3rd of the month at 15:00 (AccountingMax |
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## is per month) |
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#AccountingStart month 3 15:00 |
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## Administrative contact information for this relay or bridge. This line |
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## can be used to contact you if your relay or bridge is misconfigured or |
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## something else goes wrong. Note that we archive and publish all |
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## descriptors containing these lines and that Google indexes them, so |
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## spammers might also collect them. You may want to obscure the fact that |
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## it's an email address and/or generate a new address for this purpose. |
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#ContactInfo Random Person <nobody AT example dot com> |
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## You might also include your PGP or GPG fingerprint if you have one: |
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#ContactInfo 0xFFFFFFFF Random Person <nobody AT example dot com> |
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## Uncomment this to mirror directory information for others. Please do |
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## if you have enough bandwidth. |
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#DirPort 9030 # what port to advertise for directory connections |
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## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in |
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## DirPort (e.g. to advertise 80 but bind to 9091), you can do it as |
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## follows. below too. You'll need to do ipchains or other port |
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## forwarding yourself to make this work. |
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#DirPort 80 NoListen |
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#DirPort 127.0.0.1:9091 NoAdvertise |
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## Uncomment to return an arbitrary blob of html on your DirPort. Now you |
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## can explain what Tor is if anybody wonders why your IP address is |
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## contacting them. See contrib/tor-exit-notice.html in Tor's source |
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## distribution for a sample. |
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#DirPortFrontPage /etc/tor/tor-exit-notice.html |
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## Uncomment this if you run more than one Tor relay, and add the identity |
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## key fingerprint of each Tor relay you control, even if they're on |
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## different networks. You declare it here so Tor clients can avoid |
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## using more than one of your relays in a single circuit. See |
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## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#MultipleRelays |
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## However, you should never include a bridge's fingerprint here, as it would |
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## break its concealability and potentionally reveal its IP/TCP address. |
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#MyFamily $keyid,$keyid,... |
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## A comma-separated list of exit policies. They're considered first |
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## to last, and the first match wins. If you want to _replace_ |
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## the default exit policy, end this with either a reject *:* or an |
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## accept *:*. Otherwise, you're _augmenting_ (prepending to) the |
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## default exit policy. Leave commented to just use the default, which is |
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## described in the man page or at |
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## https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html |
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## |
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## Look at https://www.torproject.org/faq-abuse.html#TypicalAbuses |
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## for issues you might encounter if you use the default exit policy. |
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## |
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## If certain IPs and ports are blocked externally, e.g. by your firewall, |
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## you should update your exit policy to reflect this -- otherwise Tor |
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## users will be told that those destinations are down. |
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## |
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## For security, by default Tor rejects connections to private (local) |
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## networks, including to your public IP address. See the man page entry |
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## for ExitPolicyRejectPrivate if you want to allow "exit enclaving". |
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## |
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#ExitPolicy accept *:6660-6667,reject *:* # allow irc ports but no more |
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#ExitPolicy accept *:119 # accept nntp as well as default exit policy |
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#ExitPolicy reject *:* # no exits allowed |
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## Bridge relays (or "bridges") are Tor relays that aren't listed in the |
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## main directory. Since there is no complete public list of them, even an |
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## ISP that filters connections to all the known Tor relays probably |
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## won't be able to block all the bridges. Also, websites won't treat you |
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## differently because they won't know you're running Tor. If you can |
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## be a real relay, please do; but if not, be a bridge! |
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#BridgeRelay 1 |
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## By default, Tor will advertise your bridge to users through various |
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## mechanisms like https://bridges.torproject.org/. If you want to run |
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## a private bridge, for example because you'll give out your bridge |
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## address manually to your friends, uncomment this line: |
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#PublishServerDescriptor 0 |
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